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OBJECTION TO PORTIONS OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant E. D. Shelledy believes it is necessary to raise a 
couple points in clarification of the Statement of Facts as 
propounded by Salt Lake County in its brief. 
First, Salt Lake County asserts that the property in dispute 
"...had been sold to Salt Lake County at a preliminary tax 
sale..." at the time the SBA acquired its interest in the 
property. Such language misstates the preliminary tax sale 
statutes and attempts to lend unwarranted support to the County's 
interpretation of the interests of the various parties hereto in 
the property immediately before and after the 1984 May tax sale 
proceeding. See Argument, Point I, infra. 
Second, the County's allegation that at the time of the 1984 
tax sale, "...taxes were due and owing for 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982 
and 1983, in the total amount of $5,408.63" assumes as fact its 
legal conclusion over one of the major points in dispute in this 
lawsuit, i.e., whether any taxes could lawfully be assessed 
against the property after its acquisition by the SBA in 1981. 
See, R. 71-77. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SBA HAD AN INTEREST IN THE 
PROPERTY OVER WHICH CONGRESS HAD 
NOT WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
Shelledy and Salt Lake County disagree on the legal effect 
of the preliminary tax sale of 1978 on the subsequent interests 
of the parties. The County continues to allege, in spite of the 
1 
language of the preliminary tax sale statute, that the property 
was "sold" to the County at the preliminary tax sale, and then 
effectively treats the County as titleholder to the property. 
The County asserts that the SBA acquired only a right of 
redemption from its predecessors-in-interest, the Pearsons, 
pursuant to the quit-claim deed in 1981. 
Although any interest over which Congress had not expressly 
waived immunity would survive the County's tax sale attempts, 
Shelledy believes that the SBA acquired record title ownership 
interest in the property from the Pearsons, subject to the lien 
of the County as of the date of the 1981 deed. Utah's statutes 
and case law support Shelledy's position respecting the legal 
effect of the preliminary tax sale. 
Perhaps most directly indicative of the effect of a 
preliminary tax sale on the interests of the record titleholder 
at the time is Section 59-10-42 (now Section 59-2-1353): 
In all cases where any county claims a lien 
on real estate for delinquent general taxes 
which have not been paid for a period of four 
years, such county may foreclose such lien by 
an action in the district court. 
Id. [Emphasis added.] 
The above statute provides the County with an alternative 
method of foreclosing its tax lien besides the final May tax sale 
procedure. One must presume that had th€> legislature intended a 
preliminary tax sale to actually sell the property to the County, 
it would not have continued to refer to the County's interest as 
a lien. Nor, of course, would there be any need to statutorily 
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provide for the final May tax sale procedure or the judicial 
foreclosure option to similarly foreclose the county's lien 
interest. 
Utah case law also supports Shelledy on this issue. In the 
case of Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc. v. Colman, 30 Utah 2d 379, 
518 P.2d 165 (1974) the Court made clear that a record 
titleholder retains rights of ownership after the preliminary tax 
sale: 
Corroborating the idea that the owner 
continues to have some interest in his 
property until there is a valid May sale are 
these provisions of Subsection (6) of Section 
59-10-64 relating to that sale: [cite 
omitted] While there may be some overlapping 
of the language of this statute with the idea 
that the owner is required to redeem prior to 
April 1st, the emphasized language, that 
after the May sale the "property shall 
thereupon vest in the county" plainly imports 
that there remained in the property owner 
(plaintiff) some ownership interest therein. 
Otherwise there would be nothing left to 
"thereupon vest in the county." 
Id. at 382 (P.2d, at 167). 
Similarly, in Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982), 
the court implied by its recitation of the facts that a 
preliminary tax sale does not deprive the record owners of any 
ownership rights, including the ability to convey those rights to 
others. After reciting the chain of events from the assessment 
on and preliminary tax sale of the property while title was in 
the plaintiff Dillmans, through various conveyances of the title 
after the preliminary tax sale and up until the time of the final 
May tax sale, the court stated: 
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"Following the sale [preliminary tax sale], 
neither the plaintiff nor any of the 
subsequent titleholders paid the 19 64 
taxes ... ." 
Id. at 9 76. [Emphasis added.] See, also, Bozievich v. Slechter, 
109 Utah 373, 376, 166 P.2d 239 (1946) (tax sale certificate does 
not purport to convey title to the land). 
Thus, since the SBA acquired record title ownership interest 
in the property via the 1981 quit-claim deed from the Pearsons, 
the sovereign immunity of the United States applied to the 
property and Salt Lake County was without authority to enforce 
its tax lien through the 1984 May tax sale. United States v. 
Alabama. 313 U.S. 274, 61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1940). Nor 
could the County assess further taxes on the property after title 
was acquired by the SBA. United States v. City of Roanoke, 258 
F.Supp. 415 (W.D.Va. 1966). 
POINT II: 
THE COUNTY'S LIMITATIONS POSITION IS 
UNTENABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Salt Lake County's position regarding its claim of a bar by 
limitations statute to Shelledy's quiet-title claim simply cannot 
be supported under any view of the facts of this case. 
Shelledy believes the statutes of limitation cannot apply 
under the circumstances of the instant action, as has been set 
out in more detail in his Appellant's Brief, Point III. In a 
nutshell, Shelledy's position is that such limitations statutes 
cannot apply to create a valid tax title under circumstances 
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where the County lacks authority over the property to convey 
title. The County alleges that Shelledy has misinterpreted the 
language of various cited decisions. Shelledy will not further 
belabor the point at this time, but refers the court to his 
previously stated arguments. 
However, the Court may choose to decline to address the 
question of the applicability of the limitations statutes because 
the County has not seriously addressed Shelledy's point that, 
even if the limitations statutes did apply in this case, they 
could not commence to run until Shelledy purchased the property 
from the SBA, less than six months prior to initiating his quiet 
title action herein. 
The County has made some generalized references to cases 
involving the issue of whether the government was the real party 
in interest, absent which the sovereign immunity of the United 
States would not apply, and then leaps to the conclusion that 
since the government no longer claims an interest in the 
property, the limitations defense to Shelledy's quiet title claim 
is available. 
The County fails to recognize that in this case, as in any 
limitations claim, it must be able to show when the limitations 
period started, and that the full statutory period ran its course 
to a date after which the statutory bar would be effective. 
Under the facts of this case, the County simply cannot establish 
these points because of the sovereign immunity of the United 
States. At the time of the 1984 May tax sale and continuing to 
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the sale to Shelledy in December, 1989, the SBA claimed ownership 
interest in the subject property. For the County to successfully 
claim a limitations bar against Shelledy, the limitations period 
would have to have run during the time of the SBA's ownership, 
which it could not do because of the immunity of the federal 
government. United States v. Nashville, C. & St.L.R. Co. , 118 
U.S. 120, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 30 L.Ed. 81 (1886); support, United 
States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 364 U.S. 301, 
81 S.Ct. 1, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960). The County has cited no 
authority to suggest any way in which the statutory period may 
run during the time of SBA ownership and thus bar Shelledy in his 
quiet title action filed less than six months after acquiring the 
property from the SBA. 
During the SBA's time of ownership of the property, it was 
obviously the real party in interest, and the County's suggestion 
that there is no direct burden on the government when the County 
purports to sell the property of the sovereign at a tax sale is 
patently ridiculous. There can scarcely be any greater burden 
than the deprivation of the government's property interest, and 
until Congress expressly consents to such a taking, it cannot be 
done by any state or local government entity. 
POINT III. 
KEMMERER COAL CO. v. BYU IS 
DISTINGUISHABLE AND NOT CONTROLLING 
IN THIS CASE. 
One of the County's key arguments against Shelledy in this 
action is that he lacks standing to assert the sovereign immunity 
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of the United States, under the doctrine that one may not assert 
the constitutional rights of another. The County cites the case 
of Kemmerer Coal Company v. BYU, 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Shelledy believes he is not "raising the constitutional 
rights of another" in the first place and that such doctrine is 
inapplicable in this case. Shelledy is not seeking to cloak 
himself in the sovereign immunity of the United States, as was 
the situation in some cases cited by the County. See, e.g., 
Northside Canal Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 8 F.2d 739 
(D.C. Wyo. 1925). He simply asserts the legal effect of the 
County's purported 1984 tax sale in light of the ownership of the 
property by his grantor, the SBA. 
In any event, there remains a critical distinction between 
the instant case and the Kemmerer Coal Co. v. BYU case which the 
County fails to acknowledge or address, and which cannot be 
overemphasized. In Kemmerer, the situation involved a dispute 
over a tax deed which, although apparently issued in a 
procedurally defective manner by county tax authorities, was 
"executed by the same authority that could have passed good title 
if each and every statutory step in perfecting a tax title had 
been followed... . •• Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah2d 310, 293 P.2d 884 
(1955). In the instant action, because the record title 
ownership of the property was in the SBA which enjoys the 
sovereign immunity of the United States, Salt Lake County could 
not under any circumstances pass good title to the property 
without the express consent of Congress. Thus, this case falls 
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squarely within the parameters set out by the Utah Court in 
Hansen v. Morris, supra, when it discussed the scope of the 
special statutes of limitations favoring tax deeds. Despite the 
broad language of the statutes, the Hansen Court recognized that 
such statutes could not apply where the authority executing the 
tax deed could not pass good title* 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Baxter v. Utah Dept. 
of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Ut.App. 1989), cert, denied 133 
U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1990), implicitly recognized the inapplicability 
of the limitations statutes where the county "had no authority to 
tax the property, to acquire title when taxes were unpaid, or to 
convey title through a tax deed." Id. at 1047. Although the 
underlying reasons for the lack of authority to convey title 
through a tax deed are different, the end result is the same—the 
counties had no authority over the property and the special 
limitations statutes have no application to such situations. 
Also with regard to the Kemmerer case, Shelledy believes it 
must be strictly limited to its facts. In Kemmerer, the Tenth 
Circuit was faced squarely with a fact situation falling within 
the area over which the Utah Supreme Court previously had 
reserved its opinion—that is, the application of the special 
statute of limitations where the tax title was allegedly acquired 
by "...means repugnant to fundamental fairness or whether such an 
application of the statute would exceed the limits of statutory 
intent or constitutional permissibility." Frederiksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831 n.14 (Utah 1981). 
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In Kemmerer, the original tax title to the disputed coal 
interests was issued in 1941 at a time when the records indicated 
ownership in San Rafael Fuel Company. The chain of title arising 
from the tax deed ultimately arrived at BYU. Well over thirty 
years after the issuance of the tax title to Emery County and 
more than twenty years after Emery County issued a tax deed to 
BYU's predecessor in interest, San Rafael's successor attacked 
the validity of the tax title. 
Rather than address the difficult issue reserved by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Frederiksen, the Tenth Circuit chose to dispose 
of the matter by reciting the principle of a litigant not 
asserting the constitutional right of another. However, the 
Court's decision is perhaps best explained by the indication 
that, under the peculiar facts of that case, "While it may have 
been 'repugnant to fundamental fairness' to deprive San Rafael of 
its property without proper notice, we do not believe it 
fundamentally unfair to apply the statute of limitations to 
Kemmerer... •" Kemmerer Coal Co. v. BYU, supra, at 57-58 
(emphasis added). It is submitted that the Tenth Circuit, unable 
to find or seek guidance from the Utah Supreme Court at the time, 
determined that, under the facts before it, application of the 
limitations statutes to cut off a due process claim was 
warranted. 
It should also be noted that the sole federal court case 
cited by the Kemmerer court in support of raising this standing 
argument to bar a grantee's assertion that its grantor's due 
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process rights were violated does not, in fact, support the 
Kemmerer decision. In United States v. Haddon, 550 F.2d 677, 
(1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
standing of the defendants to assert that condemnation 
proceedings denied due process to the owners at the time of the 
condemnation for the specific reason that the defendants lacked 
any privity of title with the owners whose rights they claimed 
were violated. The Haddon defendants were not in the chain of 
title of those who were owners at the time of the condemnation 
proceedings, but derived their title from a tax deed in 
contravention to the title of those owners. 
Thus, the standing determination in Haddon was a result of 
the lack of privity, which does not support the Kemmerer court's 
decision. The doctrine of standing deals, in essence, with 
whether the litigant has a personal stake in the issue presented. 
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, lOlS.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 
(1981); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed 2d 
343 (1975). There can be no greater stake in an issue than a 
possibility of losing one's interest in his property, and 
Shelledy would submit that the question of standing in this type 
of case is not a legitimate issue. Any grantee has the right to 
assert defects in a tax sale to the same extent as his grantor 
who owned the property at the time of the tax sale. Support, 
Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1950); Preston v. Iron 
County, 105 Wis. 2d 346, 314 N.W. 2d 131 (1981); Morcum v. 
Brunner, 30 Wash. App. 532, 635 P.2d 778 (1981); McGuiness v. 
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Mavnard, 658 P.2d 1104 (Mont. 1983). To deny a successor-in-
interest the right to assert claims of his predecessor in an 
effort to clear his title would lead to untenable results. For 
example, assume that a piece of property is sold at a tax sale 
without any compliance with notice requirements, resulting in a 
due process violation. If the property owner then died, under 
the County's position, his heirs or estate would lack standing to 
assert that due process violation in attacking the tax sale 
because their due process rights were not violated and they are 
not allowed to assert the rights of another, even their 
predecessor-in-interest. Such important rights to claim 
interests in property cannot be determined upon a mere fortuity 
of the time of death of an owner, and it seems obvious that a 
challenge to their standing could not be upheld to bar the heirs 
from disputing the tax sale in such circumstances. Similarly, 
the County's standing argument lacks merit in this case, and 
Shelledy urges the Court to reject the unsupported attempt to 
greatly expand currently accepted standing doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The County and the tax sale purchasers ultimately are asking 
this Court to allow them to do that which the law does not 
permit—deprive the sovereign of an ownership interest in 
property without the express consent of Congress. 
Appellant E. D. Shelledy respectfully requests the Court 
reject the County's argument, reverse the decision of the trial 
court and order the trial court to enter judgment quieting title 
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to the property in Shelledy and against all defendants, and 
ordering defendant Salt Lake County to refund the amounts 
Shelledy paid it under protest, less the amount of the County's 
tax lien as of January 14, 1981, and any legitimate tax accrued 
since the purchase by Shelledy. 
Shelledy also respectfully requests the Court award him 
costs on appeal and to direct the trial court to award him costs 
in the trial court proceedings. 
DATED September /7, 1990. 
^ . ; ^ ^ ^ 
"ERIC P. HARTMAN 
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